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(or perhaps rather reversing) a 'privatization of se-
curity', where the state has ceased to provide do-
mestic security and the citizens hence have taken 'the
law' in their own hands, most often in the form of
hand-guns.
Conclusion
We have thus seen that while some Cold War
arms control schemes have been rendered obviously
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irrelevant by the end of the Cold War, there is still a
role to play for arms control and defence restructur-
ing in the new Europe. The purpose would be the
traditional one of arms control, namely to prevent
wars, both international and intra-state, and to limit
their destructiveness, should they nevertheless oc-
cur. As Mark Twain might have put it, 'the rumours




Since about the beginning of the year the
phrase "eastern policy" or Ost-Politik has been ap-
pearing with more and more frequency in the Italian
media. It relatively quickly entered the political vo-
cabulary of Farnesina (Italian foreign affairs minis-
try), while those in the know observe that it was
invented by the current under-secretary in the same
ministry, Piero Fassino. The phrase both conceptu-
ally and verbally depicts the Italian political initia-
tive, the new political course that, as a Mediterra-
nean regional power, it is projecting towards the
countries in ex-Yugoslavia, to Slovenia and Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Macedonia,
as well as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and from
there to the countries of the ex-USSR.
The rise of
the Italian "eastern policy"
"An Italian eastern policy really does exist".
This was expressly confirmed by Fassino himself in
the middle of January this year. At a time when
Belgrade was alight with demonstrations against
Milosevic, Fassino stated that the winds that were
blowing through the Balkans, thinking mainly of
Serbia, showed to what extent central and south east
Europe was crucial for the future of the whole of the
continent. The creation of a new security architec-
ture in the Balkan region had its own focus, for by
the end of the century the EU and NATO would
spread towards that region. In this context, in
Fassino's opinion, key topics in this part of Europe,
like for example immigration and the fight against.
international crime, would also lead to the necessity
for Italy to have closer ties with the countries of cen-
tral and eastern Europe. Fassino also mentioned the
interdependence of Ita I)' and the countries of central
and eastern Europe, the long-standing cultural links
and the very considerable political relations, par-
ticularly in recent times, between Italy and some of
the countries of this region, all of which suggests
the need for closer collaboration in both economics
and culture. It gets stressed that in the countries of
the central and eastern region, Italy is the second
most important trading partner, and that it is the num-
ber one partner for Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Macedonia and Albania. In this context the Foreign
Report of the respected London weekly The Econo-
mist had a headline at the beginning of November
last year that ran "The surprising Italians", referring
to the initiatives of Italian foreign politics with re-
spect to central and eastern Europe.
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Fassino, then, does not deny that there is an
Italian Ost-Politik created in Farnesina, backing it
up by reference to the Italian involvement in Bosnia
and in the Contact Group for the implementation of
the Dayton Agreement. He stresses Italian support
for the expansion of the EU and NATO to the east,
wishing to avoid new walls being put in the way of
certain countries. He mentions enhanced tri-lateral
collaboration among Italy, Slovenia and Hungary,
which, as he said, Austria, Croatia and Slovakia have
already expressed the desire to join in. In this con-
text it is necessary to note the attention that Italy paid
to the events in Belgrade when the "democratic crash"
came, which other central European countries had
gone through in 1989/90. The visit at the time ofthe
Italian foreign minister, Lamberto Dini, to Belgrade
and the attempt at an agreement between the oppos-
ing sides at the beginning of December 1996 also
speaks of the Italian involvement in eastern Europe.
Italian strategy in central and eastern Europe is a con-
fmnation, in Fassino 's opinion, that Italy can, and does,
have a foreign policy capable of affirming specific
national interests and competing in the definition of
the European and international order.
Illustrating the political strategy towards east-
ern Europe, Fassino sees the driving force ofItalian
eastern policy in the excellently taken positions in
the east European area in recent years, irrespective
of the lack of or weakness of a systematic logic. This
lack can be corrected, says Fassino, by consistent
political and democratic action. The new and fre-
netic Italian diplomacy in this strategic area is intel-
ligible if one bears in mind the danger of the region
being given over to the economic and financial mo-
noculture of the Germans. For this reason, Fassino
has made a tour of all the countries of central and
eastern Europe save for Bulgaria, where he will go
when conditions allow.
The discovery of central and eastern Europe
came as no surprise, nor was it a matter ofItaly sud-
denly falling in love with the region. It is, in Fassino's
opinion, an observation of the reality that is the heart
of all the processes that are redefining the identity
of Europe itself. Soon, he said, many of these coun-
tries will be part of the EU and NATO, and for this
reason Italy has to create an appropriate position for
itself, seeing that it is, after Germany, from the Bal-
tic to Bulgaria, the most powerful economic power.
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
A tri-Iateral initiative
with "former enemies"
The Italian press noted in February the meet-
ing of representatives of Italy, Slovenia and Hun-
gary in Rome, where Italy proposed the creation of a
joint military force that would be formed by "former
enemies" who now want to join NATO, having in
mind Hungary, once part of the Warsaw Pact, and
Slovenia, once in non-aligned Yugoslavia. The ques-
tion had already been discussed at a technical level
was to be put to the defence ministers ofItaly, Hun-
gary and Slovenia, the plan fitting into the frame-
work of "enhanced co-operation" known in the dip-
lomatic vocabulary as a "tri-lateral initiative".
Under Secretary in the Italian foreign affairs
ministry Piero Fassino who met with his Hungarian
and Slovene opposite numbers, made it clear that the
final decision about military collaboration was not yet
defined, and that co-operation between the three na-
tions assumed other forms as well- in culture, trans-
port, defence, the environment and the fight against
crime. The initiative for the creation of the trilateral
task-force was important as an anticipation of the de-
sired entry of Slovenia and Hungary into NATO. This
is a matter of entries, said Fassino, that Italy is very
much in support of, hoping that these two countries
would enter NATO with the first group of country-
candidates. And that is, among other things, the gen-
eral political result of the diplomatic forcing that is
known by the phrase the Italian new Ost-Politik.
In recent months Fassino, Dini, Andreatta and
Prodi have successively visited countries in central
eastern and south eastern Europe. Italy has decided to
invest political and economic resources in the region
and offer its neighbours, above all Slovenia and Hun-
gary, its international political support, expecting from
them in return preferential treatment of Italy in cul-
ture and economics. An initiative has been announced
for the creation of a so-called joint task force so as to
speed up the entry of Hungary and Slovenia into the
EU and in parallel into NATO. The relationship i trois
has been stepped up in the meantime in all regions. In
May the heads of government of Italy, Hungary and
Slovenia met in Budapest - Romano Prodi, Gyula
Horn and Janez Dmovsek. At this meeting, as had
been expected, the leading say was had by Italy. In
Budapest the three signed a declaration expressing the
hope and wish that the next meeting of the Atlantic
Council, to be held in Madrid, would give clear indi-
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cations with respect to the NATO question, and that
Slovenia and Hungary would be included in the first
round of invitations to joint the Atlantic pact.
Current events in Croatia and FR Yugoslavia,
that is the demonstrations in Zagreb (Radio 10I) and
in Belgrade (anti-Milosevic) at the end of November
and the beginning of December 1996 also encouraged
Fassino to make statements. He said that he had met
Milosevic in the second part of November and had
long talks with him, talks which in the light of what
was going on in the squares of the Balkans (strikes in
Belgrade) were a reliable thermometer for the fever
that was growing in Belgrade and Zagreb, and a hint
of future scenarios. Fassino is of the opinion that the
post-war phase undeniably opens up new perspectives
and is favourable to the political dialectic that the war
smothered and postponed.
"Perhaps we are about to see a democratic tran-
sition that has happened already in the other states
of eastern Europe," said Fassino. Still, Fassino thinks
that the demonstrations in Belgrade and Zagreb can
not lead to any instability in these countries and
threaten the painstaking process of finding peace.
He would like it to turn out differently. If the peace
continues to hold, he said, there will be the more
room for democracy. Peace and democracy are not
and do not have to be in opposition. It is desirable
for the opposition to keep their actions within the
limits of peaceful confrontation and that the regimes
should recognise the need for change if they want to
enter the international community fully.
Fassino does not talk of the collapse but of the
development of democracy, which is the final end of
the peace, and has to be the fruit of stability, renewal
and coexistence among the peoples in ex-Yugoslavia.
This, thinks Fassino, is the most authentic and broad-
est meaning of the Dayton agreement: the attainment
. of peace as a precondition for the creation and func-
tioning of democratic institutions.
The priorities of
the Italian Ost-Politik
As far back as summer last year, Fassino's east-
ern policy was attacked by the representatives of the
neo-right in Italy, who accused him of softness in re-
lations with the Slovenes, and particularly with the
Croats. Fassino stated that such a critical attitude was
not in line with real Italian policy towards central
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Europe and the Balkans. For this reason he stressed
the government line, when he said that central and
Balkan Europe were absolutely priority strategic re-
gions for Italy, whether for well known reasons of
security and stability, or whether because of the eco-
nomic and trade links in which Italy was the number
one or two partner in the region (in competition with
Germany), or whether because of the strong cultural
and historical links that had tied Italy for decades to
the region. Italy would be capable of being a bridge
between central Europe and the EU.
This priority was translated, in Fassino's think-
ing' into a precise strategy, which can be seen in: an
active role in the handling of the peace process in ex-
Yugoslavia (confirmed by the success of the Florence
conference and the presence ofItalians in IFOR), in a
constant and visible presence in the capitals of the
region in order to encourage dialogue among the par-
ties, and the renewed launching of the central Euro-
pean initiative as an instrument of regional integra-
tion. Apart from that, there is also the growth in bi-
lateral collaboration and support for European and
Atlantic integration as an essential factor for the con-
solidation of democracy in these countries.
It is in this context that Fassino places relations
with Croatia and Slovenia, neighbouring countries that
Italy is closely connected with and with which Italy
wishes to developed better and better conditions for
co-operation. A part of this policy of integration is
full protection for the rights of the Italian minorities,
not because Italy has got any nostalgic demands to
make, but because the recognition of the de iure and
de facto rights of minorities is a measure of the de-
gree of democracy and civilisation of every country.
According to Fassino, a moderate and linear
stance has been adopted towards Croatia, with which,
as he says, Italy wants step up relations in order to
serve three aims: encourage Croatia towards a full
implementation of Dayton, for only if Zagreb (and
Belgrade, and Sarajevo) feels fully responsible, will
the peace last; to encourage everything that will make
Croatia more European, so as to consolidate democ-
racy and the rule of law, and, finally, ensure full pro-
tection, in principle and in fact, for the Italian com-
munity of Istria. •
